The following article is reprinted from
The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute
for Defence Studies, London, United Kingdom
June 1985 issue
Viktor Suvorov, a former member of the Soviet General Staff, is now in the West. He is the product of the Brezhnev era and the new generation Soviet Army Officer. The author provides hitherto unpublished insights into Soviet military dispositions during the months leading up to the German attack. Suvorov is the author of three authoritative works on the Soviet Armed Forces: The Liberators, Inside the Soviet Army, and Soviet Military Intelligence; he is now studying for a Ph.D. and this article represents part of his thesis.
Historians who have hitherto uncritically accepted the thesis that Stalin was the victim of unprovoked aggression in the summer of 1941, may have cause to revise, or at least modify, their views.
On Friday 13 June 1941, Moscow Radio broadcast a rather unusual report by TASS which stated that: “the rumours of Germany’s intentions to tear up the Pact and to undertake an attack on the USSR are without any foundation,” and that such rumours were “clumsy propaganda by forces hostile to the USSR and Germany and interested in an extension of the war.” The following day the central Soviet newspapers published this report and, a week later, Germany launched a sudden, treacherous attack on the Soviet Union.1 It was quite obvious that Stalin himself had written the TASS report. His characteristic style was familiar to everybody: the generals in the command staffs,2 the prisoners in GULAG,3 and foreign analysts.4 Many historians, both in the USSR and in the West, consider this TASS report to have demonstrated at best a complete failure to understand the nature of current events and at worst a remarkable piece of criminal negligence.5 Aside from the question of Stalin making a statement which was so rapidly and dramatically proved to be entirely mistaken, there is the more fundamental issue of why he found it necessary to make a statement at all. Was he not after all, of all tyrants, the most silent? Many historians have noted Stalin’s quite staggering ability to keep silent at times of crisis and on major policy issues, and indeed some critics consider his silence to have been Stalin’s greatest weapon.6 Moreover, many Soviet senior commanders bear witness to his true beliefs being quite the reverse of what the TASS statement was suggesting, and that in reality he considered war with Germany to be inevitable.7 If Stalin had suddenly revised his judgement on the probability of war, his most likely course would have been to discuss the problem with his closest advisers or simply to keep it to himself. Why, then, was Stalin’s view of Germany’s pacific intentions towards the Soviet Union made so embarrassingly public?
Furthermore, the tenor of the TASS report also seems out of keeping with contemporary communist ideology. The communist propaganda (and this was especially true of Stalin’s Russia) involved the constant repetition of one simple idea: we are surrounded with enemies. This was a very useful cry; it rationalised then, as indeed it does now, such things as why the state frontiers were closed, why opposition had to be destroyed, why there are no free elections, why there was no free press and why it was necessary to produce guns instead of butter. This notion of an ever-present threat permits an explanation of anything that is required. Whole generations of Soviet citizens have been brought up on this simple credo which is presented in the newspapers, cinemas, books, radio broadcasts, and even in schoolbooks. And yet, on this singular occasion, the national radio loudly announced to the whole country and the whole world: The threat of aggression does not exist!
However, it would be a mistake merely to consider Stalin’s TASS statement as ill-judged: incomprehensible and inexplicable would be more appropriate interim judgements, pending a detailed investigation of what lies behind the words.
13 June 1941, the date of Stalin’s TASS report, is one of the most important dates in the whole Soviet history, infinitely more important than 22 June 1941, the day of the German invasion. Many Soviet marshals and generals write about 13 June with more precision and detail than they do about the 22nd. What follows is a typical example from the account of General N. I. Biryukov, then commanding 186th Rifle Division stationed in the Ural Military District:
“On 13 June 1941 we received a directive of special importance from District Staff according to which the division must move to ‘a new camp.’ The address of the new quarters was not communicated even to me, the divisional commander. Only when passing through Moscow did I learn that our division was to be concentrated in woods to the west of Idritsa.”8 All the divisions in the Ural Military District received similar orders signaling a move to the western frontier. The official history of the district fixes this date with precision: “The 112th Rifle Division was the first to begin loading. On the morning of 13 June the first echelon moved off from a small railway station . . . then began the despatch of 98th, 153rd, 186th Rifle Divisions. The movement of troops was carried out in secret.”9
Corps staffs were created to coordinate the operational deployment of the Ural divisions which were secretly concentrating in the Byelo-Russian forests and 22nd Army took command of the Corps. Lieutenant-General F. A. Ershakov, the commander of the Ural Military District, took command of this new army and the District Chief of Staff, Major-General G. F. Zakharov took charge of the Army Staff. Thus, the whole Ural Military District, including the commander, his staff, and all the subordinate formations, secretly began to move westwards. Unusually, the Deputy Commander of the district, Lieutenant-General M. F. Lukin, whose normal role would have been to remain behind as the district commander, had some time earlier been ordered to report to the Transbaikal Military District where he formed up and took command of 16th Army and, at the very moment when TASS was broadcasting its strange report, was secretly making his way westwards at the head of the army.10
Similar movements were simultaneously taking place in all the internal military district11 of the Soviet Union. The District Commanders, Lieutenant-Generals A. K. Smirnov, I. S. Konev, F. M. Remezov, V. F. Gerasimenko, S. A. Kalinin, and V. Y. Kachalov (respectively commanding the Kharkov, North Caucasian, Orel Volga, Siberian, and Archangel Military Districts), transformed district staffs into staffs of the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 24th, and 28th armies. Bearing in mind the 16th and 22nd armies mentioned earlier, a total of eight complete armies suddenly appeared in the country’s internal districts. The 18th was to be posted to the strength of the 1st Strategic Echelon12 of the Red Army, the remaining seven (in all 69 tank, motorised, and rifle divisions) made up the 2nd Strategic Echelon. Of the eight armies, five were immediately and secretly moved to the Ukraine and Byelo-Russia. All Soviet sources emphasise the secrecy of all these moves: “Before the actual commencement of war reserve forces began to assemble in the frontier districts under conditions of the strictest secrecy.”13 “The other three armies were put under orders to move.”14
Only lack of transport prevented all eight armies from moving simultaneously. Earlier, in April and May, troop movements on a vast scale had been carried out from the interior towards the German border. All the spare capacity of the entire national rail transport system had been taken up with this major and secret operation. It was completed on time but the rolling stock had then a return journey of thousands of kilometers. Of necessity, the later and even more extensive troop deployments had to take place successively. Concerning these earlier troop movements, the former deputy to the minister of the National Inspectorate, I. V. Kovalev, reports as follows: “In the period May to the beginning of June the USSR transport system had to ensure the transportation of about 800,000 reservists . . . this had to be done secretly.”15 Nor were these May deployments restricted to ordinary ground troops, as Colonel-General I. Lyudnikov records: “Being in May 1941 on the staff of the 36th Rifle Corps, I learnt that an airborne corps was concentrated in the Zhitomir area and in the woods of the South-West of it”.16
Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan was a colonel at this time and held the post of Head of the Operational Department of the staff of the Kiev Special Military District. Among other formations for which the district was to take responsibility he notes that during the latter part of May 1941 it took command of the 31st Rifle Corps newly arrived from the Far East after a journey of over 10,000 kilometers, and then at the end of the month absorbed 34th Corps from the North Caucasian Military District. This latter Corps alone had 48,000 men in its four rifle divisions and had a mountain division in addition, “. . . we had to provide quarters for almost a whole army in a short time. At the end of May, echelon after echelon started to arrive.”17 In this way the 1st Strategic Echelon of the Soviet Army was secretly reinforced.
In the middle of June, when TASS was broadcasting its strange report and the Soviet press was bringing it to a wide public, the Military Council of the Odessa Military District received instructions to create an army administration in Tiraspol, near the Romanian border18 for the 9th Army, the most mobile and powerful of all. But the activity in the frontier zone was concerned not merely with digesting such large reinforcing formations; there also began a secret regrouping of units within the frontier districts. “Under the guise of changing summer camps the formations drew closer to the frontier . . . The majority of movements took place at night.”19 Soviet official publications are full of reports like: “On 14 June 78th Rifle Division under Major-General F. F. Alyabushev, on the pretext of training exercises, was moved out towards the state frontier”20 and, “Before the actual war, some formations of the Western Special Military District began to move out towards the state frontier in conformity with GS instructions”21 and “on 14 June the Military Council of the Baltic Military District confirmed the plan for the redeployment of a number of divisions and individual regiments to the frontier zone.”22 These eye-witness accounts are also notable for their emphasis on the secrecy of these moves in the frontier belt, the efforts made to disguise them and the readiness of the units concerned for active operations. The accounts of three officers who later attained the highest ranks in the Soviet Army underline this point. Marshal of the Soviet Union, R. Ya. Malinowski, at the time Major-General in command of 48th Rifle Corps in the Odessa Military District, writes: “As far back as 7 June the corps left the Kirovograd area for Bel’tsy and, on 14 June, was in situ. This movement took place under the guise of large-scale training exercises.”23 Colonel Bagramyan, who is mentioned earlier, was busy preparing the move of five rifle and four mechanised corps towards the frontier zone.24 On 15 June he was instructed to begin moving all five rifle corps out to the frontier and notes, “they took with them everything necessary for active operations.”25 Marshal of the Soviet Union, M. V. Zakharov, at that time Major-General and Chief of Staff of 9th Army in Odessa Military District, notes that: “On 15 June, 30th and 74th Rifle Divisions assembled in woods to the east of Bel’tsy under the pretext of training exercises.”26
There were in fact 170 divisions in the 1st Strategic Echelon. Of these, 56 were already deployed directly on the frontier.27 114 were deployed further back in the frontier zone, but: “On 12-15 June the order was given to the western military districts: all divisions stationed in the interior [of those military districts] are to be moved nearer to the state frontier.”28 The entire 1st Strategic Echelon now began its concentration directly in the border belt. To these 114 must be added the 69 divisions of 2nd Strategic Echelon which had either moved already or were preparing to do so. Thus on the day of the famous TASS communique the movement of 138 divisions was in train: the biggest troop movement by a single state in the history of civilisation; a movement right to the frontier itself and conducted with maximum secrecy and concealment.
Returning to the TASS report of 13 June, the communique does not only speak of German intentions, but also of Soviet actions: “Rumours that the USSR is preparing for war with Germany are false and provocative . . . the summer assemblies of Red Army reserves and forthcoming manoeuvres have no other object than the training of reservists and checking the functioning of rail transport. It is well known that this is an annual event, therefore to describe these measures as hostile to Germany is absolutely absurd . . .” When comparing the explanation in the TASS report with what actually happened on the ground we note a certain discrepancy, not untypical of Stalin, between words and deeds. On the one hand the soothing report, on the other massive top secret troop concentration on the frontier.
The TASS report states that the moves were concerned with “checking the rail network apparatus.” However, the concentration of troops had begun in March, reached a vast scale in May, and in June assumed simply gigantic proportions. In other words, rail transport (the most important national transport system) was paralysed for four full months, and this at harvest time when each and every waggon is worth its weight in gold; hardly an exercise as routine as “checking the rail network apparatus.” The explanation that the moves were “normal training,” is similarly untrue. Training was carried out in the autumn when the harvest had been gathered in and the fields were empty and, moreover, when the Army’s assistance with harvesting was completed. But “this rule was broken in 1941.”29 It is not surprising that Major-General S. Iovlev, commanding 64th Rifle Division of 44th Rifle Corps of the Western Special Military District, should have commented that the “unusualness of the assemblies put people on their guard.”30 Hence the oft-repeated phrase “under the pretext of training” in the accounts of the Soviet marshals and generals reporting these deployments.
Another possibility is that the troop movements were designed as a demonstration of strength. But to be effective, demonstrations need to be seen; these moves were as secret as it was possible to make them.
An alternative explanation for the massive troop movements is that Stalin, whatever his declarations in the TASS report, genuinely expected to be attacked by Germany, and was secretly massing his armies to create and man defences along the frontier. But this explanation is not borne out by the facts. Troops preparing for defence bury themselves in the ground, dig trenches and anti-tank ditches, construct cover and barbed wire barricades. In the first instance, this is done in the most likely avenues of enemy advance, across roads and behind river lines. But the Red Army did nothing of the kind. As has been recorded earlier, divisions were hidden in woods near the frontier in exactly the same way as were the German divisions before they made their surprise attack. “The rifle troops could have occupied and completed defensive installations, but this was not done.”31
This failure to erect defensive works is all the more curious since, with the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty and the subsequent “partition” of Poland between the two states, Soviet and German forces now confronted each other across a common frontier with no “buffer state” between them. Moreover, while common prudence might have dictated the strengthening or at least the retention of the Stalin Line fortification along the old frontier, the opposite was happening. This powerful protective system was dismantled and, in many places, blown up or earthed over; minefields were disarmed and over a distance of thousands of kilometers “the barbed wire had been removed.”32 Partisan detachments, which had been created in case these lands were occupied by the enemy, were disbanded;”33 explosive charges were removed from thousands of bridges, railway stations, and industrial complexes which had been prepared for destruction in case of invasion. In short, colossal efforts were made to destroy everything connected with defence.34 At the same time, while prior to the treaty’s signature only divisions and corps had existed in the Soviet frontier districts, formed armies now began to assemble in the newly-extended border zone. Between August 1939 and April 1941, the number of armies on the Soviet Western border increased from zero to 11. Three more joined them during May together with five airborne corps. If Hitler had not attacked first, Stalin would have had 23 armies and more than 20 independent corps facing him. This took place before general mobilisation.
In the 1930s, Soviet military doctrine considered that a future major conflict would be a war of armies and millions of men, but that it would not be necessary to await the moment when the mobilisation of these millions was complete before the offensive began. It was considered that in frontier districts, even in peacetime, there should be troops who would cross the frontier and enter enemy territory on the first day of war, thus disrupting enemy mobilisation and covering their own. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. E. Egorov thought is essential, even in peacetime, to have “invasion groups” on the frontier.35 Marshal of the Soviet Union M. W. Tukhachevski considered that this understated the case somewhat. In his view, there should not be “invasion groups” but “invasion armies.” In the opinion of Tukhachevski, “the strength and deployment of the forward army must, in the first instance, be subordinate to the ability to cross the frontier immediately following the announcement of mobilisation . . . it is essential for mechanised corps to be deployed near the frontier . . . mechanised formations must be deployed within 50 to 60 kilometers of the frontier . . . so as to be able to cross it with effect from the first day of mobilisation.”36
Marshals Egorov and Tukhachevski were later executed during Stalin’s purge (both these officers had held very high positions in the Red Army and subsequently in the government) but their ideas were extended and developed by the man who succeeded in 1940 to the position of Chief of the General Staff and rapidly became the Army’s outstanding practitioner, the master of surprise offensives, Army General (later Marshal) G. K. Zhukov. Under Zhukov’s direction the principle was laid down that “responsibility for the performance of the invasion army tasks must be laid on the whole of the 1st Strategic Echelon.”37
The 1st Strategic Echelon which was forming up on the Soviet border in June 1941 was, by virtue of its organisational structure, deployment, and military preparedness, clearly offensive in nature. So, too, was the 2nd Strategic Echelon which began its secret movements towards the German frontier on 13 June 1941. Many Soviet marshals and generals do not acknowledge these facts directly and, of course, both echelons were overwhelmed in the German surprise attack and had perforce to fight defensively. However, they had not planned to do so, as Army General M. Kazakov, speaking of the armies of the 2nd Strategic Echelon, notes: “after the beginning of the war, the plans for their use had to undergo a cardinal change.”38 Major-General V. Zemskov expresses their strategic purpose more precisely, “we were forced to use these reserves, not for offensive action as according to the plans, but for defence.”39 Lieutenant-General M. F. Lufkin, who himself participated in these events as commander of 16th Army which formed part of the 2nd Strategic Echelon, explains the matter simply and clearly: “we were formed to fight on enemy territory.”40 Whilst that other specialist in surprise blows dealt at enemy territory, Marshall A. M. Vasilevski, underlines the opinion of General Lukin: “in his words there is much stern truth.”41
It seems certain that the Soviet concentration on the frontier was due to be completed by 10 July.42 Thus the German blow which fell just 19 days earlier found the Red Army in a most unfavourable situation – in railway waggons. Numerous Soviet reports read like the following: “when the war began 63rd Rifle Corps was underway,”43 “at the beginning of the war the 200th Rifle Division was underway,”44 and “on the outbreak of the war the 48th Rifle Division was underway.”45 Many lines of tanks, still traveling on their railway flatcars, found themselves stuck helpless in open fields. Nor was it only a question of tanks but of guns, stores, and vehicles as well. The total losses incurred in this way are not known but there are one or two pieces of evidence available. One authority notes that: “towards the end of June 1941, 1,320 trainloads of lorries were standing on the lines in the frontal belt.”46 The immense scale of this railway operation makes it obvious that somebody had organised it before the outbreak of war, loaded the tanks and lorries onto trains, transported them over enormous distances, and then been unable to unload them.
There were other victims of the unfortunate timing of the German attack, as Colonel-General of Artillery I. Volkotrubenko explains: “In 1941 the Western Front47 lost 4,216 waggons of ammunition.”48 A rather strange casualty was a huge consignment of maps, as Lieutenant-General M. Kudriavzev notes: “There were about 200 waggons with topographical maps in the Baltic Western and Kiev Special Military Districts. We had to destroy the greater part of these.”49 The loss of these maps deserves closer examination. Why were they in waggons? Where was it intended to send them? What sort of maps were they? If they were maps of interior regions of the USSR, they should have been in the interior regions, there was no need to send them anywhere.
The more closely one studies Stalin’s actions during this critical period, the more apparent it becomes that they were not a reaction to Hitler’s moves.50 Stalin acted according to his own plans and these foresaw a full concentration of Soviet troops on the frontier by 10 July. In determining what these plans portended, it is important to consider what would have happened if Hitler had not attacked before that date and Stalin had had the opportunity to complete his troops concentration on the German frontier in peace and secrecy.
Certain conclusions are incontrovertible. First, the mobilised divisions could not have returned to the distant districts from whence they came. Such a move again would have absorbed the entire resources of the rail network for many months and would have resulted in economic catastrophe. Secondly, these gigantic forces could not have been left to spend the winter where they were hidden. So many new divisions had been created and assembled in the frontal belt that many of them had already had to spend the winter of 1940-41 in dugouts.51 As early as 1940 there had been insufficient training centres and artillery and rifle ranges in the newly-acquired western frontier zone even for the existing divisions.52 Troops who cannot train rapidly lose the capacity to fight.
In every major complex human endeavour there exists a critical moment at which events reach a point of no return. This moment for the Soviet Union fell on 13 June 1941. After that day, masses of Soviet troops were secretly but inexorably moving towards the German border. Once 13 June had passed, the Soviet leadership could no longer turn these troops back nor even halt them, for economic and military reasons. War became inevitable for the Soviet Union, irrespective of how Hitler might have acted. Finally, the composition and disposition of the forces in the frontier zone did not indicate that they were intended to remain there. Such features as the airborne corps in the first crust of the “defences,” artillery units in the forward locations, the dismantling of the Stalin Line, and the absence of any defence in depth or effort to construct one, do not point to the intention of maintaining any permanent defensive position along the border. If all this is viewed in the context of the Zhukov doctrinal framework outlined earlier, then it becomes clear that the only credible military intention which Stalin could have had was to begin the war himself in the summer of 1941.
1. Many historians date this famous TASS communique 14 June, but it is significant that it was broadcast throughout USSR on 13 June.
2. Major-General P. Grigorenko, V podpolie mogno vstretit tolo krys (Detinetz, New York, 1981), p. 249.
3. G. Oserov, Tupolevska sharaga (Possev-Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 1971), p. 108.
4. B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (Pan, London, 1978), p. 161.
5. For example, R. A. Medvedev, Let History Judge (Alfred Knopf, New York, 1974), p. 900, Werth, A., loc. cit.
6. R. Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties (Macmillan, London, 1968).
7. Marshal K. A. Meretskov, Na Sluzhbe narodu (Pol. Lit., Moscow, 1968), p. 202.
8. Lieutenant-General Birykov, Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal (VIZ, 1962, 4), p.60.
9. Krasnoznamernii Uralsky: History of Ural Military District, (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1983), p. 104.
10. Soviet Military Encyclopaedia, (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1978), Vol. 5, p. 34 (Hereafter cited as SVE).
11. Soviet writers customarily distinguish between frontier districts which have a common boundary with another state and internal districts which do not.
12. Strategic echelons are operational deployments of Soviet armies: they are created only when military action is impending.
13. Army General S. M. Shtemenko, Generalnii shtab v gody voiny (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1968), p. 26.
14. Army General S. P. Ivanov, Nachalnii period voiny (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1974), p. 211.
15. I. V. Kovaliov, Transport v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine (Nauka, Moscow, 1981), p. 41.
16. Colonel-General I. Ludnikov, “Pervie dny voiny,” VIZ 9 (1966).
17. Marshal I. Kh. Bagramyan, “Zapisky nachalnika operativnogo otdela,” VIZ I (1967), p. 61.
18. A. Khorcov, “Meropriyatia po povisheniu boevoi gotovnosti,” VIZ 4 (1978), p. 86.
19. Ivanov, op. cit., p, 211.
20. Kievsky krasnoznamionny: History of Kiev Military District (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1974), p. 162.
21. Krasnoznamenny Byelorussky Voennii okrug: History of Byelorussian Military District (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1963), p. 18.
22. SVE, Vol. 6, p.517.
23. Marshal R. J. Malinovski, “Dvadzatiletie nachala VOV,” VIZ 6 (1961), p. 6.
24. Marshal I. Kh. Bagramyan, Tak nachinalas voina (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1971), p. 64.
25. ibid, p. 77.
26. Marshal M. V. Zahkarov, “Stranitsy istorri Vooruzhennykh sil nakanune Velikoi voiny,” Voprosy Istorii, 5 (1970), p. 451.
27. Istoriya Vtoroi Mirovoi voiny (1939-1973), Vol. 4, p. 25 and Vol. 3, p. 441.
28. V. Khovostov, Major-General A. Grilev, “Nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini,” Kommunist 12 (1968), p. 68.
29. Ludnikov, op. cit., p. 66.
30. Major-General S. Iovlev, “V boiyakh pod Minskom,” VIZ 9 (1960), p. 56.
31. V. A. Anfilov, Nachalo Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1962), p. 44.
32. Iolev, op. cit., p. 57.
33. VIZ 8 (1981), p. 89.
34. I.T. Starinov, Mini jdut svoego chasa (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1964), p. 186.
35. Marshal A. I. Egorov, “Doklad nachalnika shtaba RKKA RVS SSSR,” VIZ 10 (1963), p.31.
36. M. N. Tukhachevski, Izbrannye proizvedeniya (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1964), II, p.219.
37. VIZ 10 (1963), p. 31.
38. Army General M. Kazakov, “Sozdanie i ispolzovanie strategicheskikh rezervov,” VIZ 12 (1972), p. 46.
39. Major-General V. Zemskov, “Nekotorie voprosy sozdaniya i ipsolzovaniya strategicheskikh reservov,” VIZ 10 (1971), p, 13.
40. Lieutenant-General M. F. Lukin, “V Smolenskom sragenii,” VIZ 7 (1979), p. 43.
41. Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, VIZ 7 (1979), p. 43.
42. Ivanov, op. cit., p. 211.
43. G. P. Kuleschov, “Na Dneprovskom rubege,” VIZ 6 (1966), p. 17.
44. Ludnikov, op. cit., p. 68.
45. VIZ 7 (1974), p.77.
46. VIZ 1 (1975), p. 81.
47. Once the war started, the Western Special Military District (one of five making up the Soviet Western border) was retitled the Western Front. We may suppose, therefore, that the other four frontier districts had commensurate losses, though the precise scale of these cannot he confirmed.
48. Artillery Colonel-General I. Volkotrubienko, “Artillerieskoe snabgenie v pervom periode voiny,” VIZ 5 (1980), p. 71.
49. Lieutenant-General M. Kudriavzev, “Topograficheskoe obespechenie voisk v Velikoi otechestvennoi voine,” VIZ 2 (1970), p. 22.
50. M. Mackintosh, Juggernaut (Seeker & Warburg, London, 1967), p, 136.
51. Colonel-General L. M. Sandalov, Peregitoe (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1966), 48.
52. Marshal K. S. Moskalenko.
49. Lieutenant-General M. Kudriavzev, “Topograficheskoe obespechenie voisk v Velikoi otechestvennoi voine,” VIZ 2 (1970), p. 22.
50. M. Mackintosh, Juggernaut (Seeker & Warburg, London, 1967), p. 136.
51. Colonel-General L. M. Sandalov, Peregitoe (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1966), p. 48.
52. Marshal K. S. Moskalenko, Na Yugo-Zapadnom Napravlenii (Nauka, Moscow, 1969), pp. 18-20.
SOURCE: Liberty Bell, January 1986